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ABSTRACT: The Brexit saga has reached a watershed moment. The United Kingdom withdrew from 
the European Union on 31 January 2020 and, following the expiry of the transitional period laid 
down in the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement (EU-UK WA), it ceased to be bound by EU law. By the 
same token, it entered unchartered waters as a former EU Member State trying to find its place in 
an economically integrated world. This Article takes stock of the legal affairs as they stood on 1 Jan-
uary 2021. Yet, at the same time, it puts the new EU-UK legal framework in a broader perspective. 
For this purpose, it treats as a point of reference the Political Declaration, which was signed along-
side the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. A good chunk of its potential has materialised in the EU-UK 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement (EU-UK TCA), although in some respects the proposals laid 
down in the Political Declaration are yet to turn into reality. Thus, to confine it to history books 
would be rather premature. While it is impossible to predict the future, the time is right to put the 
EU-UK legal framework under the microscope and to analyse its main legal parameters. The pre-
sent Article offers such an insight. In part I, the centre of gravity is on institutional matters.  
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I. Introduction  
Predicting the future is a rather risky business. Although the art of fortune telling spans 
centuries, experience proves that it is more intellectual and emotional roulette than any-
thing else. In a similar fashion, making any predictions about the way in which EU-UK rela-
tions would evolve was, at the time of writing, a rather hazardous exercise. The two sides 
have just parted ways with the completion of the post-Brexit transitional period on 31 De-
cember 2020, followed moments later by the entry into force on 1 January 2021 of the EU-
UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.1 Without a shadow of doubt, this was a watershed 
moment for bilateral relations between the EU and its former Member State. The key 
question remained whether it was the beginning of a beautiful friendship or the starting 
point for a tense and potentially acrimonious relationship between neighbours.2 With the 
above in mind, the time is right to take a closer look at the key parameters of the emerg-
ing new framework for EU-UK relations. As is well-known, the main beacons for navigation 
were laid in the Political Declaration, which was signed alongside the EU-UK Withdrawal 
Agreement.3 They served as a point of departure for negotiations on the post-Brexit 
framework. The talks, not without political drama, ended at the eleventh hour, facilitating 
the signing of the EU-UK TCA on 30 December 2020, and its provisional application as of 1 
January 2021.4 This, however, is unlikely to be the final scene of the lengthy Brexit opera, 
but rather a relatively swift transition between acts. Arguably, before we reach some sort 
of closing crescendo, more acts are likely to follow in the years to come.  
The aim of this Article is to take stock of the recent developments. In particular, it en-
deavours to juxtapose the ambitions outlined in the Political Declaration with what was 
eventually agreed in the EU-UK TCA, as well as in the two flanking agreements which were 
 
1 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other 
part (hereinafter referred to as EU-UK TCA). 
2 See T.G. ASH, The UK and EU Are Heading for Bad-Tempered Rivalry, Unless We Can Avert It, The Guardi-
an, 14 January 2021, www.theguardian.com. 
3 Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom. 
4 Council Decision (EU) 2020/2252 of 29 December 2020 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and 
on provisional application of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and 
the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, of the other part, and of the Agreement between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning security procedures for exchanging and pro-
tecting classified information. 
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also signed on 30 December 2020.5 As will be demonstrated, the Political Declaration 
should not yet be confined to the history books, as it has not reached its potential. To put 
it differently, some of the desiderata listed therein have not materialised in the new EU-UK 
framework, and thus they may remain points of departure for future talks. In order to 
flesh out the main contours of the future relationship laid down in the Political Declara-
tion, and how they translated into the key parameters of the EU-UK TCA (as well as the 
supplementing agreements), this Article is divided into two parts. The first instalment co-
vers institutional matters, and is organised in the following fashion. Section II looks at the 
Political Declaration, its genesis and cardinal features. It serves as the point of departure 
for Section III, where the analysis turns to the post-Brexit transitional period and the ne-
gotiations of the new EU-UK legal framework. In turn, sections IV and V focus on the for-
mal shape of the new EU-UK relationship. The foundations of the newly re-designed bilat-
eral relationship are examined in section VI. Last but not least, the EU-UK institutional set-
up is presented in section VII. Part II of the Article, which is devoted to substantive matters 
(trade in goods, services, movement of capital, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
fisheries, and the dispute settlement) will follow. 
II. Genesis of the Political Declaration  
As is well known, and by now prolifically documented in the academic literature, Art. 50 
TEU governs the withdrawal procedure.6 It gives preference for a consensual exit based 
on a withdrawal agreement. As a residual option it also provides for a withdrawal with-
out any formal agreement, should a withdrawal agreement be neither desired nor pos-
sible.7 In terms of substance, the wording of the sunset clause is vague, allowing for a 
 
5 Agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland concerning Security Procedures for Exchanging and Protecting Classified Information (hereinafter 
referred to as EU-UK SPCI); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the European Atomic Energy Community for Cooperation on the Safe and 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter referred to as Euratom-UK SPNE). 
6 See, inter alia, P. CRAIG, The Process: Brexit and the Anatomy of Article 50, in F. FABBRINI (ed.), The Law & 
Politics of Brexit, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 49 et seq.; E. JONES, The Negotiations, in F. FABBRINI 
(ed.), The Law & Politics of Brexit. Volume II. The Withdrawal Agreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2020, p. 37 et seq.; K.A. ARMSTRONG, Brexit Time. Leaving the EU – Why, How and When, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017, p 197 et seq.; C. HILLION, Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European 
Union, in A. ARNULL, D. CHALMERS (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2015, p. 126 et seq.; M. VAN DER WEL, R.A. WESSEL, The Brexit Roadmap: Mapping the Choices and 
Consequences during the EU/UK withdrawal and Future Relationship Negotiations, CLEER Working Paper 
2017/5; C. HILLION, Withdrawal Under Article 50 TEU: An Integration-Friendly Process, in Common Market Law 
Review, 2018, p. 29 et seq.; P. EECKHOUT, E. FRANTZIOU, Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2017, p. 695 et seq. 
7 See, inter alia, A. ŁAZOWSKI, Unilateral Withdrawal from the EU: Realistic Scenario or a Folly?, in Journal 
of European Public Policy, 2016, p. 1294 et seq. 
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number of perfectly sound interpretations. Not surprisingly, the preferred reading of 
Art. 50 TEU was clarified in the course of the EU-UK withdrawal talks in such a fashion 
as to serve the EU’s negotiation strategy. In many respects, the EU largely proceeded as 
if the interpretation of Art. 50 TEU was fait accompli. This applied to both the modus op-
erandi for the withdrawal process and to the substance of the exit talks. In accordance 
with Art. 50 TEU, the aim of a withdrawal agreement should be to determine the terms 
of withdrawal, taking into account the future relations between the EU and the exiting 
country. It is the latter part that proved to be rather controversial, and left a great deal 
of room for manoeuvre for the European Union and its negotiation team. Arguably, at 
least two interpretations of Art. 50 TEU were on the cards when the Brexit proceedings 
commenced. The maximalist take on Art. 50 TEU would be that the negotiations should 
cover both the terms of exit and the future relations, with a view to achieving a smooth 
downgrade from EU membership to an association or partnership of sorts.8 The mini-
malist interpretation was to proceed in the opposite direction, that is, to bring sequenc-
ing into the withdrawal modus operandi. Not surprisingly, the second option was very 
much preferred by the European Union for a host of legal and political reasons. It is 
hard to escape the conclusion that realpolitik prevailed, as the consecutive talks on the 
terms of exit and future relations gave much more bargaining power to the EU and, by 
the same token, gradually weakened the position of the exiting country. The prevailing 
school of thought held by the European Union was that an agreement concluded under 
Art. 50 TEU should cover merely the terms of exit, while the proper negotiations of a fu-
ture framework would only start when the United Kingdom had exited the EU.9 It was 
agreed that the basic contours would be determined in a non-binding document devel-
oped jointly by the EU and the UK. This, even from a formal point of view, was an inter-
esting proposition. While a withdrawal agreement is, as per Art. 50 TEU, a treaty be-
tween the EU and a departing Member State, the future relations were to be sketched 
merely in a non-binding political declaration, thus any excursions therefrom would not 
constitute breaches of international obligations. From the point of view of Brexit, this 
was a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, as soon as the United Kingdom left the 
European Union on 31 January 2020, the two sides had a beacon for navigation. On the 
other hand, it gave them ample flexibility, and permitted the United Kingdom to back-
track on the inconvenient parts of the gentlemen’s agreement as soon as the talks on 
future relations commenced.  
 
8 As advocated by the present Author in an earlier contribution to the debate. See A. ŁAZOWSKI, With-
drawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, in European Law Review, 2012, p. 523 et 
seq.  
9 See further on the EU-UK withdrawal negotiations, inter alia, A. ŁAZOWSKI, Be Careful What You Wish 
for: Procedural Parameters of EU Withdrawal, in C. CLOSA (ed.), Troubled Membership: Dealing with Secession 
from a Member State and Withdrawal from the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017, p. 234 et seq. 
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The first drafts of the Political Declaration on post-Brexit EU-UK relations were made 
public in 2018.10 Further updates appeared in the course of 2019, when the Brexit drama 
was slowly turning into an opera buffa.11 At that stage, it became rather clear that what-
ever the final shape of the Political Declaration was meant to be, it would lack detail. Yet, 
the canvas was out, and the first strokes of the painters’ brush were being made. The pic-
ture stemming from the Political Declaration was full of qualities typical of impressionism: 
blurry and distant, at best. Alas, when it comes to law, the prerequisite of legal certainty 
requires precision and shading known from the old Dutch school. One needs a Vermeer, 
while the impressionists, or even more so, the abstract artists, should remain confined to 
art galleries, and under no circumstances are they to serve as intellectual points of refer-
ence for lawmakers. So, to the disappointment of many, the Political Declaration was 
merely a starting point. The language employed by the drafters allowed one to identify 
the areas where there was consensus on the steps forward, and dossiers where the par-
ties only managed to indicate their intentions to engage in discussions when the time was 
right. Hence, the Political Declaration is – in some respects – a deal in the making, and in 
others a wish-list. In hindsight, this is hardly surprising bearing in mind that the United 
Kingdom commenced its EU withdrawal negotiations without a clear idea where it was 
heading. In the wake of the Brexit referendum, the mediocrity of its political circles came 
to the surface. It was a Molotov cocktail of fantasy visions, sheer ignorance and clear-cut 
opportunism.12 Most of the time, the ruling Conservative Party was busy negotiating with 
itself, not with the European Union.13 Towards the end of the withdrawal proceedings, the 
latter showed clear signs of exacerbation with the painful lack of detail coming from Lon-
don. Three consecutive extensions of EU membership, and the consequential delay of 
Brexit, added to the fatigue. Nevertheless, the general contours of future relations were 
available when the post-Brexit negotiations commenced in March 2020. 
 
10 See, for instance, Draft Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship 
between the European Union and the United Kingdom, 22 November 2018, XT 21095/18, 
www.consilium.europa.eu. 
11 See further, inter alia, P. CRAIG, Brexit, A Drama: The Interregnum, in Yearbook of European Law, 2018, 
p. 3 et seq. 
12 See, for instance, D. DAVIS, Trade Deals. Tax Cuts. And Taking Time before Triggering Article 50. A Brexit 
Economic Strategy for Britain, Conservative Home, 11 July 2016, www.conservativehome.com. 
13 See, inter alia, F. FABBRINI, The Brexit Negotiations and the May Government, in European Journal of Le-
gal Studies, Special Issue, 2019, p. 1 et seq.; E. JONES, The Negotiations: Hampered by the UK’s Weak Strategy, 
in European Journal of Legal Studies, Special Issue, 2019, p. 23 et seq.  
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III. The transitional period and post-Brexit negotiations 
iii.1. The transitional period: raison d'être and the basic parameters 
The United Kingdom exited the European Union on 31 January 2020. On 1 February 
2020 the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement entered into force and, by the same token, the 
transitional period commenced.14 The raison d'être was to avoid a cliff-edge scenario by 
extending the application of the EU acquis to the United Kingdom throughout the transi-
tion and, at the same time, facilitating negotiations of the future EU-UK framework.15 It 
should be noted that during the transition the UK was also permitted to negotiate its 
own agreements with non-EU states, under the condition that none could enter into 
force until EU law ceased to apply to the UK.16 Art. 126 WA, setting the calendar for the 
end of the transitional period, was drafted on the premise that the United Kingdom 
would leave the European Union, as scheduled, on 29 March 2019. This did not happen, 
and one of the consequences of the three consecutive extensions of membership was 
that the time pencilled in for future negotiations shrank to a mere 11 months.17 It 
should be added that Art. 132 WA envisaged the possibility of a jointly agreed one-off 
extension of the transitional period, which could have pushed the deadline to 31 De-
cember 2021, or even 31 December 2022.18 A decision in this respect would have had to 
 
14 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from 
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter referred to as the EU-UK 
Withdrawal Agreement or, for short, EU-UK WA). 
15 See further on the transitional period, inter alia, A. ŁAZOWSKI, Exercises in Legal Acrobatics: The Brexit 
Transitional Arrangements, in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No 3, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 845 et seq.; 
K.A. ARMSTRONG, After EU Membership: The United Kingdom in Transition, in European Journal of Legal Studies, 
Special Issue, 2019, p. 59 et seq.; K.A. ARMSTRONG, The Transition, in F. FABBRINI (ed.), The Law and Politics of 
Brexit. Volume II, cit., p. 171 et seq.; M. DOUGAN, An Airbag for the Crash Test Dummies? EU-UK Negotiations for 
a Post-withdrawal “status quo” Transitional Regime under Article 50 TEU, in Common Market Law Review, 2018, 
p. 57 et seq.; T. LOCK, In the Twilight Zone: The Transition Period in the Withdrawal Agreement, in J. SANTOS 
VARA, R.A. WESSEL, P.R. POLAK (eds), The Routledge Handbook on the International Dimension of Brexit, London 
and New York: Routledge, 2021, p. 30 et seq. 
16 See further, inter alia, P. KOUTRAKOS, Managing Brexit. Trade Agreements Binding on the UK Pursuant to 
Its EU Membership, in J. SANTOS VARA, R.A. WESSEL, P.R. POLAK (eds), The Routledge Handbook on the Interna-
tional Dimension of Brexit, cit., p. 75 et seq.; M. CREMONA, The Withdrawal Agreement and the EU’s Internation-
al Agreements, in European Law Review, 2020, p. 237 et seq.; J. LARIK, Brexit, the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, 
and Global Treaty (Re-)Negotiations, in American Journal of International Law, 2020, p. 443 et seq.; R.A. WESSEL, 
Consequences of Brexit for International Agreements Concluded by the EU and Its Member States, in Common 
Market Law Review, 2018, p. 101 et seq.; S. SILVEREKE, Withdrawal from the EU and Bilateral Free Trade Agree-
ments. Being Divorced is Worse?, in International Organizations Law Review, 2018, p. 321 et seq.; A. ŁAZOWSKI, 
R.A. WESSEL, The External Dimension of Withdrawal from the European Union, in Revue des affaires eu-
ropéennes, 2016, p. 623 et seq. 
17 See further, inter alia, F. FABBRINI, R. SCHMIDT, The Extensions, in F. FABBRINI (ed.), The Law and Politics 
of Brexit. Volume II, cit., p. 66 et seq. 
18 Modus operandi for the extension of the transitional period was provided in Art. 132 WA.  
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be taken before 1 July 2020. However, any extension was not only ruled out – almost ab 
initio – by HM Government, but was also written into UK law.19 Arguably, the decision in 
this respect was taken on a political whim and did not seem to be a part of a thought-
through strategy. Once again, the Brexit dogma prevailed. Surprisingly, even the eco-
nomic mayhem caused by the Covid-19 pandemic did not make the UK government 
change its mind. The desire to end the transition at the earliest possibility was formally 
communicated to the EU during the meeting of the EU-UK Joint Committee on 12 June 
2020,20 and three days later confirmed at the High Level Meeting of the Prime Minister 
B. Johnson with the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commis-
sion.21 As made clear by the Council Conclusions on EU-UK relations, the United King-
dom not only refused to ask for an extension but also would not entertain such a re-
quest should it come from the European Union.22 All in all, the transitional period end-
ed on 31 December 2020. Such lack of flexibility in Whitehall had a number of implica-
tions. For instance, it meant that the EU-UK negotiations had to be conducted without a 
moment to spare. Thus, the talks had to focus on the priority dossiers, pushing some 
other matters to the margins. Furthermore, it forced the EU-UK Joint Committee to in-
tensify work on filling the gaps in the EU-UK WA, including the adoption of a highly con-
troversial set of detailed rules governing trade between Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land.23 
iii.2. Political Declaration and the negotiations of the future EU-UK 
framework 
The basic rules on the post-Brexit negotiations were laid down in Art. 184 WA. It provid-
ed that the two sides were obliged to make their best endeavours to negotiate the 
agreements regulating the future relationship. They were expected to do so in good 
faith and with respect to their legal orders. As already noted, the key parameters were 
laid down in the Political Declaration. The mere existence of such a bilaterally agreed 
 
19 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s. 15A (as introduced by European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Act 2020, s. 33). 
20 Press statement by Vice-President Maroš Šefc ̌ovič following the second meeting of the EU-UK Joint 
Committee, Brussels 12 June 2020, Statement/20/1055, 1. 
21 Council of the EU, EU-UK Statement following the High Level Meeting on 15 June 2020, Brussels 15 
June 2020, Statements and Remarks 401/20. 
22 Council, Conclusions on EU-UK relations, Press Release 436/20, 25 June 2020, para 1. 
23 Decision 4/2020 of the Joint Committee established by the Agreement on the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atom-
ic Energy Community of 17 December 2020 on the determination of goods not at risk; Decision 6/2020 of 
the Joint Committee established by the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community of 
17 December 2020 providing for the practical working arrangements relating to the exercise of the rights 
of Union representatives referred to in Article 12(2) of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. 
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set of priorities was one of the idiosyncrasies of the post-Brexit EU-UK negotiations, fa-
cilitating the talks and providing a jointly agreed point of departure.24 The talks were 
expected to be conducted expeditiously. Further details were provided in Part V of the 
Political Declaration. Another idiosyncrasy of the negotiations of the future EU-UK 
framework was their general objective: a downgrade of existing relations from fully 
fledged, although with plenty of opt-outs, EU membership to a future relationship of 
sorts.25 For the first time in history, the European Union and one of its neighbours were 
going against the stream. This phenomenon was reflected in the opening paragraphs of 
the Political Declaration which, on the one hand, set ambitious objectives, yet, on the 
other hand, highlighted contrapuntal tendencies. While the United Kingdom was ex-
pected to attempt to keep as many elements of membership as it found fit, the Europe-
an Union was ready to act in such a way as to preserve the integrity and coherence of 
its legal order, in particular its flagship project – the internal market. Both sides agreed, 
however, that the future relations should be based on “an ambitious, broad, deep and 
flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation with a comprehensive and 
balanced Free Trade Agreement at its core, law enforcement and criminal justice, for-
eign policy, security and defence and wider areas of cooperation”.26 It should be noted 
that this list was non-exhaustive, thus the parties were, at least in theory, free also to 
venture into other territories. Either way, the general premise on which the negotiations 
were to be conducted was that whatever the outcome, the future EU-UK framework 
would be based on a balance of rights and obligations. Both sides were in unison that a 
downgrade was a conditio sine qua non, with the red lines visibly marked in para. 4 of 
the Political Declaration. The EU made it clear that the autonomy of its legal order 
would be protected, including the indivisibility of the four freedoms of the Internal Mar-
ket. At the same time, the red lines drawn in Whitehall included the end of free move-
ment of persons, combined with the freedom to develop its own trade policy towards 
the outside world. The combination of opening salvos in the Political Declaration was 
supplemented by an obvious acknowledgment that the downgrade in question put the 
United Kingdom in a privileged position in comparison with other neighbouring coun-
tries. It provided that: “[t]he future relationship will inevitably need to take account of 
this unique context”.27 This caveat was favourable for both sides. Seen from Brussels, it 
made it clear that the European Union would be willing to go the extra mile and offer 
the United Kingdom privileged relations but, at the same time, it would not be under 
 
24 See further, inter alia, P. MARIANI, G. SACERDOTI, The Negotiations on the Future Trade Relations, in F. 
FABBRINI (ed.), The Law & Politics of Brexit. Volume II, cit., p. 211 et seq. 
25 See, inter alia, A. ŁAZOWSKI, Inside but Out: United Kingdom and the EU, in A. JAKAB, D. KOCHENOV (eds), 
The Enforcement of EU Law. Methods against Member States’ Defiance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017, p. 493 et seq. 
26 Para. 3 of the Political Declaration. 
27 Ibid., para. 5 of the Political Declaration.  
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any political obligation to offer the same to any other third country expressing a desire 
to deepen its relations with the EU. The same sentence, read through the Westminster 
lens, equipped the United Kingdom with ammunition for the negotiations. To put it dif-
ferently, it gave Whitehall a political mandate to demand more from the future relation-
ship than is traditionally made available to any other third country. However, as proven 
by the events of 2020, it did not indulge itself very much in this opportunity. While the 
EU offered a far reaching and comprehensive agreement, the UK was inclined to have a 
“Canada style” arrangement.28 
iii.3. Post-Brexit negotiations 
As soon as the United Kingdom was out of the European Union, the negotiators switched 
gear. On the EU side, the European Commission presented a draft of the negotiation 
mandate on 3 February 2020.29 It was approved by the Council on 25 February 2020.30 
Not surprisingly, the European Union proceeded on the basis of the modus operandi laid 
down in Art. 218 TFEU, which governs the procedure for the conclusion of international 
treaties.31 It was clear from the start that the negotiations with a former Member State 
were meant to be a standard, yet idiosyncratic, external relations exercise. The negotia-
tion mandate – building on the Political Declaration – was painfully detailed. The United 
Kingdom also took its first steps towards the negotiations, and alas it did so in a fashion 
known from the Brexit negotiations: with a speech by the Prime Minister outlining his 
shopping list.32 A formal policy document, listing the priorities in the forthcoming negotia-
tions, followed on 27 February 2020.33 In a matter of days, it became clear that parts of 
the Political Declaration, seen from Whitehall, were not worth the paper they were written 
on. The battleground was set for the most contentious dossiers: the level playing field, the 
role of the Court of Justice in the dispute settlement procedure, the future arrangements 
on fisheries, and the cooperation in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. To 
add to this, the UK authorities repeatedly argued that they had no wish to instal customs 
 
28 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the 
European Union and its Member States, of the other part (hereinafter referred to as the CETA). 
29 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a new part-
nership with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ec.europa.eu. 
30 Annex to Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
31 See further, inter alia, J. HELISKOSKI, The Procedural Law of International Agreements: A Thematic Jour-
ney Through Article 218 TFEU, in Common Market Law Review, 2020, p. 79 et seq.; A. DASHWOOD, EU Acts and 
Member State Acts in the Negotiation, Conclusion, and Implementation of International Agreements, in M. 
CREMONA, C. KILPATRICK (eds), EU Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018, p. 189 et seq. 
32 PM speech in Greenwich, 3 February 2020, www.gov.uk. 
33 HM Government, The Future Relationship with the EU. The UK’s Approach to Negotiations, as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk. 
1114 Adam Łazowski 
checks between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This clearly rang the alarm bells and 
raised doubts about whether the United Kingdom was ready to comply with the desidera-
tum laid down in the Political Declaration that the negotiations were to be conducted in 
good faith. Not only was it backtracking on some elements of the gentleman’s agreement, 
but it also signalled that it had no desire to comply with the binding obligation laid down 
in the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. As the talks 
progressed, it became clear that these dossiers were the main bones of contention and 
remained so until the last minute.  
From the procedural point of view, the modus operandi was agreed by the EU and the 
UK in the Terms of Reference published on 28 February 2020.34 On the EU side, the nego-
tiations were to be conducted, in accordance with Art. 218 TFEU, by the European Com-
mission. The Chief Negotiator was Michel Barnier, who had also been in charge of the 
Brexit talks. The UK Chief Negotiator was Lord Frost, who was in charge of Task Force Eu-
rope. The talks were conducted in plenary as well as in 11 negotiating groups.35 The work-
ing language was English, with negotiations in French possible as an exception. Already at 
this stage it was agreed that the draft of the agreement(s) would be prepared in English, 
and subsequently translated into other official languages of the European Union. The lat-
ter factor, as discussed later in this Article, may have be of importance should discrepan-
cies between different language versions of the EU-UK TCA become a source of dispute or 
litigation. The initial plan laid down in the Terms of Reference was to conduct five negotia-
tion rounds, with locations alternating between Brussels and London. In hindsight, the 
post-Brexit talks were not only difficult because of their substance, and the pressures of 
time, but also due to the modus operandi imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic. Due to the 
pandemic, only the first round went as planned, while the next negotiating sessions had 
to be moved online.36 While the worlds of Zoom or Skype are fit for purpose in many con-
texts, the lack of direct human interaction was not ideal during the early rounds of negoti-
ations. Covid-19 also brought disruption to the talks as members of both teams became 
infected or had to go into self-isolation. It should be added that, in-between the negotia-
tion rounds, informal talks continued. As not enough progress had been made by early 
June, the two sides agreed an Addendum to the Terms of Reference (12 June 2020),37 
agreeing on additional negotiation rounds throughout the summer, as well as specialised 
 
34 Terms of Reference on the UK-EU Future Relationship Negotiations, ec.europa.eu. 
35 1. Trade in goods; 2. Trade in services and investment and other issues; 3. Level playing field for open 
and fair competition; 4. Transport; 5. Energy and civil nuclear cooperation; 6. Fisheries; 7. Mobility and social 
security coordination; 8. Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; 9. Thematic coopera-
tion; 10. Participation in Union programmes; 11. Horizontal arrangements and governance. 
36 The negotiation rounds held on 20-24 April 2020, 11-15 May 2020 and 2-5 June 2020 took place 
on-line.  
37 Addendum to the Terms of Reference on the UK-EU Future Relationship Negotiations, 12 June 
2020, ec.europa.eu. 
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sessions between the Chief Negotiators and their closest teams. A further Addendum to 
the Terms of Reference, scheduling more negotiations, followed on 31 July 2020.38 As the 
clock was ticking, with no end of talks in sight, the Chief Negotiators on 21 October 2020 
agreed on “organising principles” that would eventually take them all the way to the com-
pletion of negotiations on 24 December 2020.39 
As soon as the post-Brexit talks commenced, it was clear that their substantive 
scope would have to be adjusted to the reality on the ground: a very tight time schedule 
and shifting desires in Whitehall. In order to give the talks a firm anchor, the European 
Commission had already on 12 March 2020 presented a Draft Agreement on Future Re-
lations.40 It was subsequently amended several times and, consequentially, revised ver-
sions were made available to the public on a regular basis.41 As a counterattack, the 
United Kingdom presented its own drafts of future agreements in May 2020. Sadly, they 
were not original by any stretch of the imagination. The government openly admitted 
that the drafts were, in fact, a compilation of various EU agreements with non-EU coun-
tries.42 To make things look even more unprofessional, parts of the text were missing. 
In hindsight, this was wasted effort, as the final text of the EU-UK TCA is clearly built on 
the EU draft with a few parts left out, others tweaked, or simply moved around.  
As already noted, the negotiations were successfully completed on Christmas Eve, a 
formal signature followed, and the three EU-UK Agreements entered into force, albeit 
 
38 Addendum to the Terms of Reference on the UK-EU Future Relationship Negotiations, 31 July 
2020, ec.europa.eu. 
39 Organising principles for further negotiations, ec.europa.eu. 
40 Draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom, ec.europa.eu (here-
inafter referred to as the Draft Agreement); Foreign Policy, Security and Defence part of the Draft text of 
the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom, ec.europa.eu. 
41 Draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom, cit.; Additional draft 
text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom 15 July 2020, ec.europa.eu ; Addi-
tional draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom 14 August 2020 (law 
enforcement and judicial cooperation), ec.europa.eu; Additional draft text of the Agreement on the New 
Partnership with the United Kingdom 18 August 2020, ec.europa.eu; Additional draft text for the Agree-
ment on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom 19 August 2020 (Cultural objects), ec.europa.eu; 
Additional draft text for the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom 7 September 
2020 (recognition of professional qualifications), ec.europa.eu. 
42 Draft UK-EU Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), assets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft 
UK-EU CFTA Annexes, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Fisheries Framework Agreement, as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Air Transport Agreement, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Civil 
Aviation Safety Agreement, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Energy Agreement, as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Social Security Coordination Agreement, as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Nuclear Energy Agreement, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk ; Draft 
Agreement on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Agreement on the transfer of unaccompanied asylum-seeking chil-
dren, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk; Draft Agreement on the readmission of people residing without 
authorisation, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk. 
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on a provisional basis, on 1 January 2021.43 This permitted the European Parliament to 
properly scrutinise the Agreements, before giving its formal assent.44 It should be noted 
that adequate privilege was not granted to the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords, which were forced to conduct parliamentary scrutiny in a matter of hours on 30 
December 2020. This was in stark contrast to the time spent on scrutiny of the acces-
sion to the European Communities45 or the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and the post-
Brexit negotiations.46 It was yet another Brexit paradox. While the EU withdrawal was 
meant to strengthen the sovereignty of the UK Parliament, it was deprived of a chance 
for meaningful debate and analysis of the post-Brexit EU-UK package. 
IV. Post-Brexit legal framework: from the drawing board to the 
Christmas Eve deal 
iv.1. Introduction  
One of the variables that had to be addressed at the outset was what shape the future 
EU-UK framework should take. Firstly, the question was whether it would comprise a 
framework agreement, supplemented by flanking agreements, or whether it would fol-
low the patchiness of the Swiss model.47 Secondly, the issue was also if, on the EU side, 
 
43 See further on the provisional application of EU agreements with third countries B. DRIESSEN, Provi-
sional Application of International Agreements by the EU, in Common Market Law Review, 2020, p. 741 et seq.; 
J. HELISKOSKI, Provisional Application of EU Free Trade Agreements, in M. HAHN, G. VAN DER LOO (eds), Law and 
Practice of the Common Commercial Policy. The First 10 Years after the Treaty of Lisbon, Boston: Brill, 2021, p. 
586 et seq. 
44 On the role of the European Parliament in conclusion of international agreements, see, inter alia, J. 
SANTOS VARA, The European Parliament in the Conclusion of International Agreements post-Lisbon: Entrenched be-
tween Values and Prerogatives, in J. SANTOS VARA, S. RODRÍGUEZ SÁNCHEZ-TABERNERO (eds), The Democratisation of EU 
International Relations Through EU Law, London, New York: Routledge, 2019, p. 63 et seq. 
45 See, inter alia, D. NICOL, EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2001, p. 76 et seq. 
46 See, inter alia, P. LYNCH, R. WHITAKER, A. CYGAN, Brexit and the UK Parliament: Challenges and Opportu-
nities, in T. CHRISTIANSEN, D. FROMAGE (eds), Brexit and Democracy. The Role of Parliaments in the UK and the 
European Union, Palgrave: London, 2019, p. 51 et seq.; A. CYGAN, E. ŻELAZNA, Parliamentary Involvement in 
the Negotiations on the EU-UK Trade Agreement, in J. SANTOS VARA, R.A. WESSEL, P.R. POLAK (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook on the International Dimension of Brexit, cit., p. 45 et seq.; A. CYGAN, P. LYNCH, R. WHITAKER, UK Par-
liamentary Scrutiny of the EU Political and Legal Space after Brexit, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2020, 
p. 1605 et seq. 
47 See further on the Swiss model, inter alia, M. VAHL, N. GROLIMUND, Integration without Membership. 
Swizterland’s Bilateral Agreements with the European Union, Brussels: CEPS, 2006; C.H. CHURCH (ed.), Switzer-
land and the European Union. A Close, Contradictory and Misunderstood Relationship, London, New York: 
Routledge, 2007; R. SCHWOK, Switzerland – European Union. An Impossible Membership?, Bruxelles, Bern, 
Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009; M. OESCH, Swizterland and the 
European Union. General Framework. Bilateral Agreements. Autonomous Adaptation, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
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it should be a mixed or exclusive competence agreement.48 In hindsight, it is clear that 
the decision in both respects was in the hands of the European Union, with the United 
Kingdom left with very little room for manoeuvre. This is further elaborated in turn.  
iv.2. The big picture: the EU’s relations with neighbours 
The tour de table of EU relations with its neighbours proves that, with the notable excep-
tion of Switzerland, the preference traditionally goes to a general overarching agree-
ment, supplemented by sectoral deals. The first are frequently organised in families of 
similar agreements with different countries clustered together for historical, geograph-
ical, or other reasons. This is the case in relation to the countries of the former Soviet 
Union,49 including the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) avant garde: Ukraine, Mol-
dova, and Georgia,50 as well as the countries of the Western Balkans51 and the Mediter-
 
2018; P. DARDANELLI, O. MAZZOLENI (eds), Switzerland-EU Relations. Lessons for the UK after Brexit?, London-
New York: Routledge, 2021. 
48 See further, inter alia, A. OTT, EU External Competence, in R.A. WESSEL, J. LARIK (eds), EU External Rela-
tions Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, London, New York, New Delhi, Sydney: Hart, 2020, p. 61 et 
seq.; P. EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 11 et seq.; P. 
KOUTRAKOS, EU International Relations Law, Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2015, p. 17 et seq. 
49 Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Com-
munities and their Member States and the Russian Federation; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement be-
tween the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Kazakhstan; Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partner-
ship between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, 
of the other part; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the other part; 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the other part. See further, inter alia, C. 
HILLION, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements Between the EU and the NIS of the ex-Soviet Union, in European 
Foreign Affairs Law Review, 1998, p. 399 et seq. 
50 Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Communi-
ty and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (hereinafter referred to as EU-
Ukraine AA); Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (hereinafter referred 
to as EU-Georgia AA); Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part 
(hereinafter referred to as EU-Moldova AA). See further, inter alia, G. VAN DER LOO, The EU-Ukraine Associa-
tion Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration With-
out Membership, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2016.  
51 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part; Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the 
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ranean.52 The latter usually include tailor-made agreements dedicated to, e.g., readmis-
sion,53 air transport54 or participation in EU missions to third countries.55 For the crea-
tion of privileged relationships, the preference, at least on the EU side, goes to associa-
tion agreements. It should be noted at the outset that in EU law, unlike in the case of 
the Council of Europe, association does not amount to partial membership of the Euro-
pean Union.56 However, it symbolises enhanced levels of cooperation between the par-
ties.57 The rule of thumb is as follows: the closer the relationship, the more likely it will 
 
other part; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Mem-
ber States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part; Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, of the other part; Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Un-
ion and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part. See fur-
ther, inter alia, D. PHINNEMORE, Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western 
Balkans?, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2003, p. 77 et seq. 
52 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part; Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an 
Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People's 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Associa-
tion between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, of the other part; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other 
part; Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European 
Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestini-
an Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement estab-
lishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the State of Israel, of the other part; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the 
other part. See further, inter alia, K. PIETERS, The Integration of the Mediterranean Neighbours into the EU Internal 
Market, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010. 
53 See, exempli gratia, Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the readmission of 
persons residing without authorisation. 
54 See, exempli gratia, Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union and its Mem-
ber States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part. 
55 See, exempli gratia, Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine on the status of the Eu-
ropean Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine. 
56 See Art. 5a of Statute of Council of Europe, which provides: “In special circumstances, a European 
country which is deemed to be able and willing to fulfil the provisions of Article 3 may be invited by the 
Committee of Ministers to become an associate member of the Council of Europe. Any country so invited 
shall become an associate member on the deposit on its behalf with the Secretary General of an instru-
ment accepting the present Statute. An associate member shall be entitled to be represented in the Con-
sultative Assembly only”. 
57 In accordance with Art. 217 TFEU: “the Union may conclude with one more third countries or in-
ternational organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions, common action and special procedure”. 
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be regulated in an association agreement. For instance, the treaties governing free 
trade areas, even with a degree of market access, have been concluded as association 
agreements. 58 While they may have several legal bases scattered around the EU Found-
ing Treaties, the use of Art. 217 TFEU would be required. As far as post-Brexit EU-UK re-
lations are concerned, association as a framework for future relations was certainly on 
the cards. Para. 120 of the Political Declaration provided that the institutional frame-
work could have taken the shape of an association agreement.  
As a matter of fact, the Political Declaration is silent as far as the legal nature of the 
post-Brexit agreements is concerned. This should come as no surprise, bearing in mind 
that a decision on exclusive competence or a mixed agreement is inextricably linked to 
its substance. As is well-known, it is not a straightforward affair, with many legal and po-
litical factors prone to collide. One thing is certain, though. For the past ten years the EU 
has battled through contrapuntal tendencies. On the one hand, exclusive competences 
in external relations were expanded qua the reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lis-
bon.59 On the other hand, the Member States approached their self-made shift of para-
digm from mixity to exclusivity with trepidation. Inevitably, this led to numerous compe-
tence battles, some of which reached the Court of Justice. Once again, the modus op-
erandi laid down in Art. 218, para. 11, TFEU proved to be a vital tool for the determina-
tion of the EU’s external competences.60 The watershed moment came with Opinion 
2/15 on the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,61 where the judges at Kirchberg inter-
preted the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in such a fashion as to reinforce 
the drive towards exclusivity.62 This, perhaps, was the only time the expansion of EU 
 
58 More on the concept of association see, inter alia, P. VAN ELSUWEGE, M. CHAMON, The Meaning of ‘As-
sociation’ under EU Law. A Study on the Law and Practice of EU Association Agreements, Study for the AFCO 
Committee, European Parliament, 2019, PE 608.861. 
59 See, inter alia, M. KRAJEWSKI, The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy, in A. BIONDI, P. EECKHOUT, S. 
RIPLEY (eds), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 292 et seq.; R. LEAL-ARCAS, The 
European Union’s New Common Commercial Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon, in M. TRYBUS, L. RUBINI (eds), The 
Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy, Cheltenham, Northampton: Elgar, 2012, p. 262 
et seq.; P. CRAIG, The Lisbon Treaty. Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 
379 et seq., J.-C. PIRIS, The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p. 238 et seq. 
60 See further, inter alia, G. BUTLER, Pre-Ratification Judicial Review of International Agreements to be Con-
cluded by the European Union, in M. DERLÉN, J. LINDHOLM (eds), The Court of Justice of the European Union. Mul-
tidisciplinary Perspectives, Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2018, p. 53 et seq. 
61 Court of Justice, opinion of 16 May 2017, case 2/15, EU-Singapore FTA. 
62 For an appraisal see, inter alia, M. CREMONA, Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 
May 2017, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2018, p. 231 et seq.; D. KLEIMANN, G. KÜBEK, The Signing, 
Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and Investment Agreements in the EU: The Case of CETA and 
Opinion 2/15, in Legal Issues of European Integration, 2018, p. 13 et seq.; A. ROSAS, Mixity and the Common 
Commercial Policy after Opinion 2/15. An Overview, in M. HAHN, G. VAN DER LOO (eds), Law and Practice of the 
Common Commercial Policy, cit., p. 27 et seq.; R. QUICK, A. GERHÄUSER, EU Trade Policy after Opinion 2/15. In-
ternal and External Threats to Broad and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, M. HAHN, G. VAN DER LOO 
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competences was received in Whitehall with open arms. It meant that the future EU-UK 
framework would likely fall within the EU’s exclusive competences and, by this token, 
ratification by all 27 Member States could be avoided. As experience with the EU-
Ukraine AA and the CETA proves, it may be a time-consuming and a rocky ordeal.63  
iv.3. Towards the post-Brexit legal framework: the Political Declaration 
and early proposals  
Analysis of the Political Declaration proves that the parties agreed ab initio to conclude 
an overarching general agreement and a selection of sectoral agreements. For a num-
ber of reasons, this is hardly surprising. Firstly, it reflected the already discussed pat-
terns of shaping EU relations with third countries, including their immediate neigh-
bours. Secondly, it gave both sides some room for manoeuvre, bearing in mind the 
number of dossiers that were of interest, and the very tight timeline for the negotia-
tions. Arguably, the raison d’être of this choice was rather straightforward: to conclude 
as fast as possible an agreement on the essential dossiers in order to make sure that it 
would enter into force at the end of the transitional period. By the same token, other 
subject areas would be covered in additional negotiations and, possibly, in separate 
agreements that would enter into force at a later date. 
The Withdrawal Agreement, as well the Political Declaration, gave several hints as to 
the flanking agreements that could be concluded alongside the main post-Brexit deal. 
To begin with, the Withdrawal Agreement envisaged the conclusion of an agreement on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy even before the end of the transitional period.64 
The Political Declaration provided for the development of the EU-UK Comprehensive Air 
Transport Agreement (CATA)65, the Euratom-UK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement66, as 
well as the tailor-made EU-UK fisheries agreement67, the Framework Participation 
Agreement for the UK’s contribution to CSDP missions and operations68, as well as the 
Security of Information Agreement.69  
 
(eds), Law and Practice of the Common Commercial Policy, cit., p. 486 et seq.; C. KADDOUS, Opinion 2/15, Free 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, delivered 16 
May 2017, in G. BUTLER, R.A. WESSEL (eds), EU External Relations Law: The Cases in Context, Oxford, New York: 
Hart, 2021 (forthcoming). 
63 See, inter alia, G. KÜBEK, The Non-Ratification Scenario: Legal and Practical Responses to Mixed Treaty 
Rejection by Member States, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2018, p. 21 et seq.; G. VAN DER LOO, R.A. 
WESSEL, The Non-Ratification of Mixed Agreements: Legal Consequences and Options, in Common Market Law 
Review, 2017, p. 735 et seq.  
64 Article 127, para. 2, EU-UK WA. 
65 Para. 58 of the Political Declaration. 
66 Ibid., para. 66. 
67 Ibid., para. 73. 
68 Ibid., para. 99. 
69 Ibid., para. 116. 
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The future EU-UK framework started to take shape soon after the commencement 
of the negotiations. As already mentioned, the European Union had already presented 
a draft Agreement on the New Partnership between the European Union and the Unit-
ed Kingdom on 12 March 2020. A simple juxtaposition of the draft with the plans 
sketched in the Political Declaration demonstrates that the EU negotiators opted for the 
consolidation of some dossiers initially pencilled in for separate agreements into one 
jumbo agreement. Arguably, such a move had merits at least in two respects. Firstly, it 
allowed the EU and the UK to avoid unnecessary fragmentation of the legal framework. 
Secondly, it gave the EU additional leverage in the negotiations, in particular in relation 
to the contentious fisheries dossier. By linking the portfolios together, the EU could eas-
ily follow its mantra that nothing was agreed until all was agreed. It also gave ground to 
the guillotine clause discussed in section V.2 of this Article. 
Proposals for the future framework, which were presented by the UK Government, 
came rather too late to make a breakthrough. Furthermore, by proposing a selection of 
agreements, the UK asked for something that was not on the menu. Winning the hearts 
and minds of EU negotiators on such a patchy framework was simply impossible, bear-
ing in mind the experience the EU had gained over the years in its relations with Swit-
zerland.70 Not surprisingly, the drafts in question became history the moment they 
were published. For the remainder of the post-Brexit negotiations, it was the EU’s Draft 
Agreement that served as the point of reference.  
V. The post-Brexit EU-UK legal framework: an overview 
v.1. Introduction 
As of 1 January 2021, the EU-UK legal framework comprises four agreements of varied 
scope and legal character. All are discussed in the analysis that follows. As the starting 
point, the EU-UK TCA is put under the microscope (section V.2). In turn, the Euratom-UK 
Agreement on Nuclear Energy and the EU-UK Security Procedures Agreement are pre-
sented (sections V.3 and V.4 respectively). Last but not least, a brief recap of the main 
features of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement is a fitting conclusion to the section (V.5).  
 
70 On the most recent episodes see, inter alia, R. SCHWOK, Switzerland-EU Relations: The Bilateral Way in 
a Fragilized Position, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2020, p. 159 et seq.; A. ŁAZOWSKI, Draft EU-Swiss Insti-
tutional Agreement: Towards a New Institutional Paradigm?, in A. BIONDI, G. SANGIUOLO (eds), EU Law, Trade 
Agreements, and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Contemporary Challenges, Cheltenham, Northampton: El-
gar, 2021 (forthcoming).  
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v.2. EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement is the core of the post-Brexit legal 
framework.71 The other two agreements concluded simultaneously, as well as potential 
future agreements, are formally referred to as supplementing agreements.72 In this re-
spect, the bilateral legal framework follows the already discussed, and well-established, 
pattern in EU external relations. With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that the EU-
UK TCA is a rather chunky legal act, spanning hundreds of pages, including protocols, 
annexes, appendices, all of which form part of the Agreement.73  
To begin with, the EU-UK TCA was concluded as an exclusive competence agreement. 
Its parties are the EU and Euratom, on one side, and the United Kingdom, on the other 
side. Therefore, for its entry into force separate ratifications by each and every Member 
State of the European Union were not required. The legal basis for its conclusion was Art. 
217 TFEU, which is not surprising bearing in mind the scope of the Agreement and the po-
litical context in which it was negotiated and signed.74 Thus, from the point of view of EU 
law, it is an association agreement. Yet, this factor has not been widely noted. Further-
more, this is reflected neither in the title of the Agreement, nor in its text. Bearing in mind 
the disproportionate attention that is sometimes paid to the phraseology, it would not 
come as a surprise if the notion “association with the EU” were too much for the hardest 
UK Eurosceptics, whose allergy to anything EU related is well-known. The association 
could have been perceived as a form of subordination or asymmetry in bilateral relations. 
Arguably, this constitutes a fitting addition to the pantheon of Brexit paradoxes. Over the 
years, many countries in the EU’s vicinity have become associated with the EU, or still as-
pire to head in that direction. One of the extreme cases was Ukraine, where more than 
100 people were shot dead at Kyiv’s Maidan during pro-EU protests. Yet, at the same time, 
one of the EU’s former members did whatever possible to prove that “Europe” and “Euro-
pean” were the hardest words. While the formal association with the EU is the most logi-
cal way to downgrade the bilateral relations from the EU membership, the notion of “as-
sociation” has gone missing, and it is nowhere to be seen in EU-UK TCA. Interestingly 
 
71 It merits attention that EU-UK TCA does not apply to Gibraltar, the status of which will be regulated 
separately. 
72 Art. COMPROV. 2 EU-UK TCA. 
73 Art. FINPROV.7 EU-UK TCA. 
74 Such an overarching legal basis permitted the EU to avoid institutional battles, which sometimes 
take place when multiple legal bases are employed (for instance Article 207 TFEU). It merits attention that 
the European Union did not use this opportunity to employ for the first time Article 8 TEU as one of the 
legal bases. Ever since the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the neighbourhood clause to the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, it has remained a lettre morte, and it is likely to continue to do so. See further, inter alia, R. 
PETROV, P. VAN ELSUWEGE, Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the Neighbouring Coun-
tries of the European Union?, in European Law Review, 2011, p. 688 et seq.; A. LABEDZKA, The European Union 
and Shaping of Its Neighbourhood: In Pursuit of Stability, Security and Prosperity, London: City Law School, 
2018, p. 117 et seq. 
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enough, in its drive towards Global Britain, the UK signed post-Brexit trade agreements 
with many non-EU states. Astonishingly, they largely mirror their originals, that is, the EU 
association or partnership agreements.75 The copy-paste frenzy has clearly gone quite far, 
as some of the newly concluded agreements create a formal association between the UK 
and the EU’s neighbours. So, as of 1 January 2021, the United Kingdom is formally in asso-
ciation with, for instance, Egypt.76 This factor is reflected both in the title as well as in the 
text of the UK-Egypt Agreement.  
Like all agreements concluded by the European Union with third countries, the EU-
UK TCA has a double legal nature. On the one hand, it is an international treaty within 
the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. On the other hand, it is a 
source of EU law with all the consequences resulting from this. It is binding, in equal 
measure, on the European Union, Euratom and on the Member States of the EU. This, 
quite inevitably, brings to the fore a fundamental question about its enforcement. This 
is pivotal not only for the state authorities but, first and foremost, for natural and legal 
persons who fall within the scope of the EU-UK TCA. In this respect, Art. COMPROV.16 
EU-UK TCA is of relevance. It reads as follows: 
“Article COMPROV.16: Private rights 
1. Without prejudice to Article MOBI.SSC.67 [Protection of individual rights] and with the 
exception, with regard to the Union, of Part Three [Law enforcement and judicial coop-
eration], nothing in this Agreement or any supplementing agreement shall be construed 
as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those created be-
tween the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting this Agreement or 
any supplementing agreement to be directly invoked in the domestic legal systems of 
the Parties. 
2. A Party shall not provide for a right of action under its law against the other Party on 
the ground that the other Party has acted in breach of this Agreement or any supple-
menting agreement”. 
It is clear from the provision in question that neither the EU-UK TCA nor the current 
or future supplementing agreements may, in general terms, produce direct effect.77 The 
only exceptions are the Protocol on Social Security Coordination and Part Three of the 
EU-UK TCA, which is dedicated to law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. The latter, however, is subject to the caveat that direct effect can only be pro-
 
75 See further A. ŁAZOWSKI, Copy-pasting or Negotiating? Post-Brexit Trade Agreements Between the UK 
and Non-EU countries, in J. SANTOS VARA, R.A. WESSEL, P.R. POLAK (eds), The Routledge Handbook on the Interna-
tional Dimension of Brexit, cit., p. 117 et seq. 
76 Agreement establishing an Association between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the Arab Republic of Egypt. 
77 It should be noted that this provision appeared for the first time, albeit differently phrased, al-
ready in the Draft Agreement presented by the European Union on 12 March 2020. 
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duced in the European Union, not the United Kingdom.78 This provision merits closer 
attention for a number of reasons. Firstly, the general prohibition of direct effect heavily 
undermines the effectiveness of the EU-UK post-Brexit framework. It is well known that 
the doctrine of direct effect, which has its roots in the rich jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, is the key to the private enforcement of EU law.79 Over the years, the judges at 
Kirchberg have ruled that the TFEU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as EU 
regulations, EU directives and EU decisions may be directly invoked by individuals in na-
tional courts.80 Furthermore, the application of this doctrine has been extended to EU 
agreements with third countries, which are also capable of producing direct effect, not 
only vertical but also horizontal.81 A good example of this is Case C-265/03 Simutenkov, 
where the Court of Justice ruled that Art. 23, para. 1, of the EU-Russia PCA, prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of nationality at the workplace, was capable of producing di-
rect effect.82 Such jurisprudence, however, was not always welcomed with open arms 
by the Member States. Therefore, in the past years a change of paradigm has become 
clearly visible. To put it differently, EU agreements with third countries, and/or Council 
decisions on the conclusion of international agreements, started to contain clauses pre-
cluding direct effect. In this respect, the EU-UK TCA is no exception, but rather a confir-
mation of the new trend.83 Still, it sits uncomfortably not only with the existing jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice but also creates a rather undesired side effect: the legal 
environment of double standards applicable to EU neighbouring countries. While, for 
 
78 This caveat was not in the original draft of the provision in questions, which may suggest that it 
was added on the initiative of the UK negotiators.  
79 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 February 1963, case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos. For an academic ap-
praisal see, inter alia, W. PHELAN, Great Judgments of the European Court of Justice. Rethinking the Landmark Deci-
sions of the Foundational Period, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 31 et seq.  
80 See further, inter alia, J.M. PRINSSEN, A. SCHRAUWEN (eds), Direct Effect. Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal 
Doctrine, Groningen: European Law Publishing, 2002; B. DE WITTE, Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of 
the Legal Order, in P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011, p. 323 et seq. 
81 For a comprehensive assessment see M. MENDEZ, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements. Maximalist 
Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; P. EECKHOUT, 
EU External Relations Law, cit., p. 331 et seq.; P. KOUTRAKOS, EU International Relations Law, cit., p. 257 et seq.; 
J. KLABBERS, International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect, in Yearbook of European 
Law, 2001, p. 263 et seq.; F. MARTINES, Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union, in Eu-
ropean Journal of International Law, 2014, p. 129 et seq.  
82 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 April 2005, case C-265/03, Simutenkov [GC]. For an academic ap-
praisal see, inter alia, C. HILLION, Case C–265/03, Igor Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real 
Federación Española de Fútbol, [2005] ECR I–2579, in Common Market Law Review, 2008, p. 815 et seq.; A. 
ŁAZOWSKI, Direct Effect, Non-discrimination and the Beautiful Game: case C-265/03 Simutenkov, in G. BUTLER, 
R.A. WESSEL (eds), EU External Relations Law, cit. 
83 See also N. GHAZARYAN, Who Are the Gatekeepers’?: In Continuation of the Debate on the Direct Applica-
bility and the Direct Effect of EU International Agreements, in Yearbook of European Law, 2018, p. 27 et seq. 
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instance, Russian, Turkish,84 or Tunisian citizens/companies85 may rely directly on the 
respective agreements with the EU, citizens/companies from the UK (a former Member 
State), Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia cannot do so. The question remains, however, 
whether the provision in question is broad enough to preclude the application of the 
other enforcement doctrines: indirect effect86 and state liability.87 Both are well estab-
lished in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and national courts of the EU Member 
States. On the one hand, it is true that Art. COMPROV.16 provides that EU-UK TCA is not 
“conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those created between 
the Parties under public international law” and that its provisions may not be “directly 
invoked”. On the other hand, legal acrobatics permitting, one could imagine attempts at 
an interpretation of national law in an EU-UK TCA compliant way, or even state liability 
claims, should the Member States act in breach of the EU-UK TCA. Firstly, in the case of 
indirect effect, the claims are built on national, not EU law. Thus, an EU legal act that is 
relied on does not per se create rights or impose obligations. Secondly, national judges 
have discretion, as the obligation to interpret domestic law in an EU law friendly way 
applies only as far as this is possible. Thirdly, in state liability claims, plaintiffs do not en-
force their rights laid down in the EU legal acts, but claim compensation for breaches of 
EU law attributable to the Member States. Further, one also needs to bear in mind that 
the Court of Justice has the jurisdiction to interpret the EU-UK TCA as per Art. 267 TFEU. 
Art. COMPROV.16 EU-UK TCE will not stop domestic courts in the EU Member States 
from sending references for a preliminary ruling. This, in the case of courts from which 
there is no further remedy, is not a right, but an obligation resting on the shoulders of 
national judges. Should they fail to comply, state liability claims may follow.88  
Arguably, it is only a matter of time before references start arriving at Kirchberg. 
One of the reasons why this may happen sooner rather than later is the linguistic ca-
 
84 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 1990, case C-192/89, Sevince. See further, inter alia, E. 
SHARPSTON, Different but (Almost) Equal – The Development of Free Movement Rights under EU Association, Co-
Operation and Accession Agreements, in M. HOSKINS, W. ROBINSON (eds), A True European. Essays for Judge Da-
vid Edward, Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2003, p. 233 et seq. 
85 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 December 2006, case C-97/05, Gattoussi. See further, inter alia, F. 
G. JACOBS, Direct Effect and Interpretation of International Agreements in the Recent Case Law of the European 
Court of Justice, in A. DASHWOOD, M, MARESCEAU (eds), Law and Practice of EU External Relations. Salient Fea-
tures of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 21 et seq. 
86 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 April 1984, case 18/43, Von Colson. See further, inter alia, S. DRAKE, 
Twenty Years after Von Colson: The Impact of “Indirect Effect" on the Protection of the Individual’s Community 
Rights, in European Law Review, 2005, p. 329 et seq.  
87 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 November 1991, joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich. See 
further, inter alia, P. AALTO, Public Liability in EU Law. Brasserie, Bergaderm and Beyond, Oxford, Portland: 
Hart, 2011. 
88 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 September 2003, case C-224/01, Köbler. See further, inter alia, Z. 
VARGA, The Effectiveness of the Köbler Liability in National Courts, Oxford, London, New York, New Delhi, 
Sydney: Hart, 2020. 
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cophony caused by the late completion of negotiations, combined with the require-
ments of the EU multilingual regime. To cut a long story short, the EU translation and 
publication services were left with no time to polish the 24 different language versions 
of the EU-UK TCA. As acknowledged in the Council Decision 2020/2252 on signing and 
provisional application of EU-UK TCA and EU-UK SPCI, and in a separate note to readers, 
published in the Official Journal of the EU, the text of the EU-UK TCA published on 31 
December 2020 is provisional and may contain inaccuracies/mistakes. Furthermore, 
neither the provisions nor the annexes or protocols are properly numbered. One 
should also note that hundreds of blank pages have been allocated to annexes, which 
have yet to be filled with actual text.89 The final versions are due for publication in the 
Official Journal of the EU by 30 April 2021 at the latest. The question remains how na-
tional authorities should proceed in the case of inconsistencies between different lan-
guage versions of the EU-UK TCA. As experience proves, they may remain even when 
the texts are finalised in due course. In the case of the EU-UK TCA, the version in English 
ought to prevail, even though all language versions are equally authentic.90 This is for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the negotiations were conducted chiefly in the language of 
Shakespeare. Therefore, this particular language version should be as close as possible 
to the intentions of the negotiators. Secondly, in accordance with Art. FINPROV.9 EU-UK 
TCA, the English version was the first to be finalised, and therefore the other language 
versions would be checked against it. 
As the final step in this general overview of the EU-UK TCA, it is worth putting under 
the microscope the rules governing revisions, suspension and termination of the Agree-
ment. The modi operandi in relation to modifications of the EU-UK TCA may be divided in-
to two groups. To begin with, the EU-UK TCA may be amended qua a formal revision trea-
ty. For entry into force, it would require the “Rolls Royce” procedure governing the conclu-
sion of international treaties by the EU, which – as already mentioned – is laid down in Art. 
218 TFEU. Furthermore, the EU-UK TCA in several places envisages simplified procedures 
permitting decisions of the EU-UK joint institutions to revise the Agreement.91 This is a 
pragmatic solution, although not original by any stretch of the imagination. Similar ar-
rangements govern the regular updates of the Agreement on the European Economic Ar-
ea92 as well as several association agreements between the EU and third countries.93  
 
89 Annex SSC-8 spans from page 1276 to 1463, all pages were blank on 31 December 2020, the date 
of publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.  
90 Article FINPROV. 9 EU-UK TCA. 
91 See, inter alia, Art. OTH. 8 EU-UK TCA, which gives the competence to the EU-UK Partnership Coun-
cil to amend parts of the Agreement itself, as well as several annexes.  
92 See further, inter alia, D.W. HOLTER, Legislative Homogeneity, in C. BAUDENBACHER (ed.), The Fundamen-
tal Principles of EEA Law, Berlin: Springer, 2017, p. 1 et seq. 
93 For example, updates to annexes to the EU-Georgia AA are made by decisions of the EU-Georgia 
Association Council or other joint bodies. See, inter alia, Decision 2/2019 of the EU-Georgia Association 
Committee in Trade Configuration of 18 October 2019 updating Annex XVI to the Association Agreement. 
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While the EU-UK TCA has been concluded for an indefinite period,94 the suspension 
or termination of parts or of the entire EU-UK TCA is on the cards. The Agreement in 
several places permits either side to trigger the suspension of its application in relation 
to specifically listed parts. For instance, a suspension may take the form of a remedial 
action in the areas of air or road transport.95 It also contains a guillotine clause in Art. 
FISH.17 EU-UK TCA. Should the section dedicated to fisheries be terminated, some oth-
er parts, including trade and aviation, would share the same fate. Art. INST. 35 EU-UK 
TCA also provides that “there has been a serious and substantial failure by the other 
party” to comply with the obligations referred to as essential elements (democracy, rule 
of law, human rights; fight against climate change; countering proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction) either party may decide to suspend or terminate parts, or the en-
tirety of EU-UK TCA or any supplementing agreement. What is more, Art. FINPROV.8 EU-
UK TCA allows each party to terminate the EU-UK TCA in toto.96  
v.3. Euratom-UK Agreement on Cooperation on the Safe and Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy 
Alongside the EU-UK TCA, Euratom and the United Kingdom also concluded a tailor-
made Agreement dedicated to cooperation on the use of nuclear energy. This also pro-
visionally entered into force on 1 January 2021,97 arguably as a logical consequence of 
the fact that by withdrawing from the European Union, the United Kingdom also with-
drew from the European Atomic Energy Community. It had no choice in this respect, as 
the membership of both the EU and Euratom is inextricably linked. However, despite 
sharing institutions with the European Union, Euratom remains formally a separate in-
ternational organisation, with legal personality in its own right. It, too, has external 
competences, which materialise in international agreements concluded as per Art. 101 
Euratom.98 The main aim of the Euratom-UK SPNE is to create a legal framework for co-
operation between the two sides in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The application 
of this Agreement is subject to the caveat that items covered by its scope may not be 
 
94 As per Art. FINPROV. 3 EU-UK TCA, the EU and the UK are expected to review the implementation 
of the EU-UK TCA, as well as the supplementing agreements in five year intervals.  
95 See, for instance, Art. ROAD. 11 EU-UK TCA, which permits suspension of the part on road 
transport or Article AIRTRANS. 25 EU-UK TCA that envisages a comparable modus operandi applicable to 
the air transport.  
96 It would lose force on the first day of the twelfth month following the date of notification. 
97 See Exchange of letters on the provisional application of the Agreement between the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland for Cooperation on the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. 
98 See, inter alia, Agreement for Cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Community and 
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the field of nuclear safety; Agreement for Cooperation between the 
European Atomic Energy Community and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the field of controlled 
nuclear fusion. 
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used for any nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device. Furthermore, they may not be 
used for research on or development of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive 
device or for any military purpose. Arts 3 and 4 Euratom-UK SPNE are at the heart of 
the Agreement. They cover, respectively, the scope and the forms of nuclear coopera-
tion.99 The Agreement in question was concluded by the European Atomic Energy 
Community on the basis of Art. 101 Euratom, and it is subject to provisional application 
just like the main EU-UK TCA. As per Art. COMPROV.16 EU-UK TCA, being a supplement-
ing agreement, it cannot produce direct effect. It is interesting to note that the Euratom-
UK SPNE was concluded for 30 years, after which it is due for renewal in ten-year inter-
vals. Arts 22 and 24 Euratom-UK SPNE also envisage suspensions and early termination 
of the Agreement. The linguistic cacophony discussed above has also reached the Eur-
atom-UK SPNE. While the version in English has been finalised, the verification of the 
text in the remaining official languages of the European Union is yet to be completed. 
As regulated in Art. 25 Euratom-UK SPNE, this is expected on 30 April 2021 at the latest.  
v.4. EU-UK Agreement on Security Procedures for the Exchange of 
Classified Information 
The third Agreement concluded on 30 December 2020 deals with the exchange of classi-
fied information between the EU and the UK. It should be noted at the outset that this is 
inextricably linked to the EU-UK TCA. Firstly, the Council of the EU signed both Agree-
ments by means of a single decision. Secondly, the legal basis for the EU-UK TCA and EU-
UK SPCI is just the same. Thirdly, Arts 19-20 EU-UK SPCI contain a guillotine clause. The 
entry into force of the EU-UK SPCI was linked to the entry into force of the EU-UK TCA. Fur-
thermore, the termination of the latter would also trigger the termination of the former. 
This Agreement, too, became applicable on a provisional basis on 1 January 2021. As in 
the case of the other two Agreements, the version in English was to be the point of refer-
ence, while the final versions in the other 23 official languages of the European Union 
were due for publication by 30 April 2021 at the latest.100 In terms of substance, this 
 
99 For instance, the Euratom-UK SPNE covers facilitating trade and commercial cooperation; the sup-
ply of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, and equipment; transfer of technology, including supply of 
information; the procurement of equipment and devices; access to and use of equipment and facilities; 
safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, including geological disposal; nuclear safety and 
radiation protection, including emergency preparedness and monitoring of levels of radioactivity in the 
environment; nuclear safeguards and physical protection; use of radioisotopes and radiation in agricul-
ture, industry, medicine and research; in particular, in order to minimise the risks of shortage of supply of 
medical radioisotopes, and to support the development of novel technologies and treatments involving 
radioisotopes, in the interest of public health; geological and geophysical exploration, development, pro-
duction, further processing and use of uranium resources; regulatory aspects of the peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy; research and development. 
100 Art. 21 EU-UK SPCI.  
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Agreement is rather brief and provides a basic framework for the exchange of classified 
information. For instance, in accordance with Art. 5, para. 1, EU-UK SPCI, the EU and the 
UK should – in relation to classified information shared or provided by the other party – 
protect it as per domestic laws in a way that own classified information is protected. Fur-
thermore, as per Art. 6, para. 1, EU-UK SPCI, classified information shall be disclosed or 
released only in accordance with the principle of originators consent.  
v.5. EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement  
Last but not least, one should not forget the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. With the 
new EU-UK legal framework in place, it is likely to be overshadowed. While many solu-
tions envisaged therein were tailor-made to regulate the intertemporal issues related to 
exit from the EU, several sections of the EU-UK WA will remain applicable for years, if 
not decades, to come. This, in particular, refers to the Part 2 of the EU-UK WA, which is 
dedicated to the acquired rights of EU citizens in the UK, and UK citizens in the EU,101 as 
well as to the Protocol on Northern Ireland.102 Furthermore, the rules on dispute set-
tlement are likely to remain relevant, too.103 While the details of the EU-UK WA have 
been analysed in the academic literature, and deserve no detailed elaboration in the 
present Article, a number of its features merit a closer look with a view to demonstrat-
ing numerous phenomena which become visible when the EU-UK WA is juxtaposed to 
the EU-UK TCA.104 First and foremost, the EU-UK WA is destined to produce direct effect. 
Art. 4 EU-UK WA leaves no doubts in this respect and, without calling a spade a spade, it 
codifies in paragraph 2 the doctrine of primacy as envisaged by the Court of Justice in 
 
101 See, inter alia, C. BARNARD, E. LEINARTE, Citizens’ Rights, in F. FABBRINI (ed.), The Law & Politics of Brexit. 
Volume II, cit., p. 107 et seq.; M. MARKAKIS, Citizens’ Rights after Brexit: The Withdrawal Agreement and the Fu-
ture of Mobility Framework, in F. KAINERM, R. REPASI (eds), Trade Relations after Brexit, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
Hart, 2019, p. 293 et seq.; S. SMISMANS, EU Citizens’ Rights post Brexit: Why Direct Effect Beyond the EU is not 
Enough, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2018, p. 443 et seq.; E. SPAVENTA, The Rights of EU Citizens un-
der the Withdrawal Agreement: A Critical Analysis, in European Law Review, 2020, p. 193 et seq. 
102 See further, inter alia, S. WEATHERILL, The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Protecting the EU’s In-
ternal Market at the Expense of the UK’s, in European Law Review, 2020, p. 222 et seq.; C. HARVEY, The Irish 
Border, in F. Fabbrini (ed.), The Law and Politics of Brexit. Volume II, cit., p. 148 et seq. 
103 On the evolution of the dispute settlement modus operandi see, inter alia, N. FENNELLY, Brexit: Legal 
Consequences for the EU. Dispute-settling Between the EU and the UK, in ERA Forum, 2018, p. 493 et seq. On the 
final solution see, inter alia, A. DASHWOOD, The Withdrawal Agreement: Common Provisions, Governance and Dis-
pute Settlement, in European Law Review, 2020, p. 183 et seq.; J. LARIK, Decision-Making and Dispute Settlement, in 
F. FABBRINI (ed.), The Law and Politics of Brexit. Volume II, cit., p. 191 et seq. 
104 For a general overview of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement see, inter alia, M. DOUGAN, So Long, 
Farewell, auf Wiedersehen, Goodbye: The UK’S Withdrawal Package, in Common Market Law Review, 2020, p. 
631 et seq.; S. PEERS, The End – or a New Beginning? The EU/UK Withdrawal Agreement, in Yearbook of Europe-
an Law, 2020 (forthcoming). 
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case 106/77 Simmenthal.105 The provision in question also attends to the contentious 
matter of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Any provisions contained in the EU-
UK WA which refer to EU law or the concepts laid down therein ought to be interpreted 
in compliance with the judgments of the Court rendered before 31 December 2020 
(that is, the end of the transitional period). However, any post-Brexit judgments should 
be given due regard.106 This stands in stark contrast to the EU-UK TCA, which – in Art. 
COMPROV.13 para. 3 – makes it clear that “an interpretation of this Agreement or any 
supplementing agreement given by the courts of either Party shall not be binding on 
the courts of the other Party”. All of this proves that the assertions of leading Brexiteers 
that the United Kingdom is now free from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice amount 
to half-truths. While this is the case in relation to the EU-UK TCA, it is certainly not so 
when it comes to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. What is more, the Court of Justice 
is also at the heart of the dispute settlement procedure laid down therein.107 Finally, 
when it comes to the status of Northern Ireland, the centre of gravity is on the EU-UK 
Withdrawal Agreement and, in all certainty, that part of the United Kingdom remains, at 
least with one leg, in the European Union. The decisions of the EU-UK Joint Committee, 
taken in December 2020, are nothing but confirmation in this respect.108  
VI. Foundations for EU-UK cooperation  
vi.1. Introduction 
The foundations for post-Brexit cooperation, as well as generally determined areas of 
shared interest, were outlined in Part I of the Political Declaration. Bearing in mind ex-
isting EU practice in external relations, the inclusion of core values and human rights 
was hardly surprising. As aptly noted by E. Cannizzaro, “the incorporation of ad hoc 
clauses into the terms of agreements with non-Member States represents one of the 
European Union’s most efficient devices with which to promote compliance with human 
 
105 Court of Justice, judgment of 9 March 1978, case 106/77, Simmenthal. For an academic appraisal 
see, inter alia, W. PHELAN, Great Judgments of the European Court of Justice, cit., p. 171 et seq. 
106 Art. 4, paras 4-5, EU-UK WA. 
107 As per Art. 174 EU-UK WA, the arbitration panels dealing with EU-UK disputes shall make refer-
ences to the Court of Justice when issues of interpretations of concepts anchored in EU law arise.  
108 See, inter alia, Decision 3/2020 of the Joint Committee established by the Agreement on the with-
drawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community of 17 December 2020 amending the Protocol on Ireland and North-
ern Ireland to the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community; Decision 6/2020 of the 
Joint Committee established by the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community of 17 De-
cember 2020 providing for the practical working arrangements relating to the exercise of the rights of 
Union representatives referred to in Article 12(2) of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. 
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rights”.109 In the case of the post-Brexit EU-UK framework, some of the solutions pro-
posed in the Political Declaration, and later developed in the Draft Agreement of 12 
March 2020, either did not survive the negotiations or have been considerably pruned.  
vi.2. The future relationship based on shared values 
As a starting point, it is worth putting under the microscope the notions employed to de-
termine the character of the post-Brexit relationship between the European Union and 
the United Kingdom. While the term “association” is nowhere to be seen, it interesting to 
follow how this politically important description of relations evolved. To start with, the Po-
litical Declaration set as the main ambition the creation of “ambitious, broad, deep and 
flexible partnership”. This was reflected in the Draft Agreement, which in Art. COMPROV.1 
proclaimed that it was to establish “a comprehensive partnership between the Parties”. 
Accordingly, the full title of the Draft Agreement was: “Draft Text of the Agreement on the 
New Partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom”. For reasons 
which were unclear at the time of writing the present Article, the nature of the bilateral re-
lationship has been considerably watered down both in the title of the main agreement 
between the EU and the UK, but also in its opening provision. The latter merely talks 
about “a broad relationship between the Parties, within the area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness”.110 This newly formed relationship is based on the autonomy and sover-
eignty of each side. One cannot escape the conclusion that such terminological peregrina-
tions are Brexit paraphernalia translated into the language of law. Arguably, it is yet an-
other example, if one were needed, of packaging ruling over content. In the same vein, 
one can interpret the final location of provisions on the foundations of the bilateral rela-
tionship. While in the Political Declaration, and in the Draft Agreement, they took a promi-
nent position in the opening parts, in the EU-UK TCA they are sandwiched between the 
section dedicated to dispute settlement and the closing provisions.  
As per Arts COMPROV.4-12 EU-UK TCA, the basis of cooperation includes democracy, 
rule of law, human rights, the fight against climate change, countering the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, the implementation of rules on illicit manufacture, transfer 
and circulation of small arms, light and other conventional weapons, the fight against the 
most serious crimes that are of concern to the international community, cooperation in 
counter-terrorism, data protection and global cooperation on matters of shared econom-
ic, environmental and social interest. It beggars belief why such fundamental and system-
ic provisions have been relegated to remote corners of the EU-UK TCA, even though the 
matters in question are mentioned in the first recital of the Preamble. The truth remains 
 
109 E. CANNIZZARO, The Scope of EU Foreign Power. Is the EC Competent to Conclude Agreements with Third 
States Including Human Rights Clauses?, in E. CANNIZZARO (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in Internation-
al Relations, The Hague, London, New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 297. 
110 Art. COMPROV.1 EU-UK TCA. 
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behind the doors of the negotiation rooms or Zoom records. However, it is hard to escape 
the cynical and speculative conclusion that such a move was to make sure that some less 
diligent readers would not spot such ambitious clauses if they were hidden in a less prom-
inent place than the opening sections of the Agreement.  
From the legal point of view, it is worth delving deeper into the provisions dealing 
with respect for human rights, in particular the status of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Paragraph 6 of the Political Declaration made it unequivocally clear that 
the future relations should be based on shared values, which include the usual mantra 
of respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democratic principles, respect for 
the rule of law and non-proliferation. Not only was the word “should” employed by the 
drafters, but it also came with the caveat that “these values are an essential prerequi-
site for cooperation”. This is not surprising for a number of reasons. Firstly, the EU is 
committed to shaping its external relations with the outside world on its own values 
listed in Art. 2 TEU.111 Secondly, the EU is generally considered to be a leading exporter 
of values based on human rights and the rule of law.112 This is against a rather precari-
ous reality, as some countries in the EU’s immediate or remote neighbourhood share 
these values only figuratively. Furthermore, some of the EU’s own Member States have 
a rather idiosyncratic relationship with the rule of law, thus undermining the EU’s legit-
imacy to pursue values-based external activities.113 Nevertheless, the opening sections 
of many EU agreements with third countries are dedicated to shared values.114 Fur-
thermore, relations with the EU’s immediate neighbours are based on strict conditional-
ity, requiring respect for fundamental values (at least at the time when an agreement is 
concluded).115 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that this general desideratum was re-
flected in the opening part of the Draft Agreement. Art. COMPROV.4 made it quite clear 
that the EU and the UK were to continue to uphold the shared values, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including commitment to the European Convention on 
 
111 Art. 21 TUE. See further, inter alia, S. OETER, Article 21. [The Principles and Objectives of the Union’s 
External Action], in H.-J. BLANKE, S. MANGIAMELI (eds), The Treaty on European Union (TEU). A Commentary, Hei-
delberg, New York, Dordrecht, London: Springer, 2013, p. 833 et seq.; T. RAMOPOULOS, Articles 21-22, in M. 
KELLERBAUER, M. KLAMERT, J. TOMKIN (eds), The EU Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 200 et seq. 
112 See, for instance, S. POLI (ed.), The European Neighbourhood Policy – Values and Principles, London 
and New York: Routledge, 2016. 
113 See, inter alia, A. VON BOGDANDY, P. BOGDANOWICZ, I. CANOR, C. GRABENWARTER, M. TABOROWSKI, M. 
SCHMIDT (eds), Defending Checks and Balances in EU Member States. Taking Stock of Europe’s Actions, Berlin: 
Springer, 2021; K. LANE SCHEPPELE, D. VLADIMIROVICH KOCHENOV, B. GRABOWSKA-MOROZ, EU Values Are Law, after 
All: Enforcing EU Values through Systemic Infringement Actions by the European Commission and the Member 
States of the European Union, in Yearbook of European Law, 2021 (forthcoming). 
114 See, for instance, Arts 2-3 EU-Ukraine AA. 
115 For a comprehensive assessment see, inter alia, N. GHAZARYAN, The European Neighbourhood Policy 
and the Democratic Values of the EU. A Legal Analysis, Oxford, Portland: Hart, 2014. 
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Human Rights. Alas, it belongs to the group of already mentioned provisions which have 
been demoted to the closing parts of the EU-UK TCA. 
In the case of post-Brexit EU-UK relations, one of the issues that concerned the ne-
gotiators was the UK’s on-going adherence to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and participation in the Strasbourg enforcement system. Such concerns have 
been perfectly justified on at least two grounds. Firstly, the Euroscepticism of the ruling 
Conservative Party is not exclusively limited to the European Union but also stretches to 
the Council of Europe. Secondly, the future EU-UK legal framework was already at the 
time of drafting of the Political Declaration destined to include arrangements for judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Arguably, the latter could only become operational if it 
were underpinned by respect for human rights. With the above in mind, para. 7 of the 
Political Declaration provided as follows: “The future relationship should incorporate 
the United Kingdom’s continued commitment to respect the framework of the Europe-
an Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), while the Union and its Member States will re-
main bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which reaf-
firms the rights as they result in particular from the ECHR”. 
This proviso clearly made the continued UK participation in the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights framework a conditio sine qua non for the future relationship and, 
if one were to read the language of the Political Declaration literally, the commitment in 
this respect would be written down into the future agreement between the two sides. 
An attempt in this direction was made by the European Union in the Draft Agreement. 
Art. LAW.OTHER.44 conditioned cooperation in criminal matters on continued adher-
ence to the European Convention on Human Rights and the maintenance of its effect in 
the United Kingdom. In respect of the latter, a reminder is fitting that the Human Rights 
Act 1998 transposed the European Convention on Human Rights with selected proto-
cols to the UK legal orders.116 With the UK being a dualist country, without such a trans-
position, the European Convention on Human Rights was only binding at the level of 
international law, with individuals being deprived of its application in national courts. 
Since the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 re-
main in equal measure on the radars of the Brexiteers, the European Commission pro-
posed the discussed solution and introduced two important locks. Firstly, in the event 
of repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998, or the lowering of levels of protection, the part 
of the Draft Agreement dedicated to cooperation in criminal matters would be sus-
pended until the status quo were restored. Secondly, in the event of denunciation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the same section of the Draft Agreement 
would be disapplied. It is little wonder that these solutions did not get people dancing in 
Whitehall. Judging by the final shape of the EU-UK TCA, a compromise was reached and, 
 
116 See further, inter alia, J. WADHAM, H. MOUNTFIELD QC, E. PROCHASKA, R. DESAI, Blackstone's Guide to the 
Human Rights Act 1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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consequentially, the language employed by the drafters became vaguer. Art. 
LAW.OTHER.136 para. 2 EU-UK TCA provides that the European Union may terminate 
Part 3 of the Agreement should the United Kingdom denounce the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. The same part of the Agreement may be suspended fully in the 
case of “serious and systemic deficiencies” of human rights, or, partly, if data protection 
standards suffer the same fate.117 As far as the former is concerned, one could arguably 
claim that the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 could, if not followed by a legislative 
substitute, be potentially considered as a deficiency big enough to trigger the suspen-
sion of Part 3 EU-UK TCA. Thus, while the automatism of termination or suspension has 
been removed from the provision in question, the end result may still be the same. The 
question remains if deficiencies in the human rights protection could have a wider 
knock-on effect, going beyond Part 3 EU-UK TCA. Arguably, in extreme cases, they could 
serve as a catalyst for the termination of EU-UK TCA.  
VII. Institutional set-up  
vii.1. Introduction 
Without exception, all association and trade agreements concluded between the Euro-
pean Union and its neighbouring countries provide for some institutional platforms for 
cooperation.118 The types of institutions, as well as the modi operandi of their function-
ing, may, however, vary from one agreement to another. In this respect, yet another 
rule of thumb is detectable: the deeper the desired cooperation, the more comprehen-
sive the institutional framework. Furthermore, for third countries engaged in enhanced 
bilateralism or enhanced multilateralism, the EU keeps the institutional door ajar, allow-
ing for very modest access to EU decision-shaping,119 and facilitates participation in se-
lected agencies.120 With the above in mind, there is no doubt that the European Eco-
nomic Area stands out with its two-pillar institutional structure, referred to by Cremona 
as Byzantine.121 It is comprised of joint EU-EFTA institutions, as well as a tailor-made 
EFTA Court and an EFTA Surveillance Authority on the EEA/EFTA side. Things are very 
much more complicated in the EU-Swiss bilateral framework, which is not only very 
 
117 Art. LAW.OTHER.137 EU-UK TCA. 
118 For a comprehensive analysis see, inter alia, S. GSTÖHL, D. PHINNEMORE (eds), The Proliferation of Privi-
leged Partnerships between the European Union and its Neighbours, London, New York: Routledge, 2019. 
119 See, in relation to the EEA, G. BAUR, Decision-Making Procedure and Implementation of New Law, in C. 
BAUDENBACHER (ed.), The Handbook of EEA Law, Berlin: Springer, 2016, p. 45 et seq.; A. ŁAZOWSKI, Draft EU-
Swiss Institutional Agreement, cit. 
120 T. BEKKEDAL, Third State Participation in EU Agencies: Exploring the EEA Precedent, in Common Market 
Law Review, 2019, p. 381 et seq. 
121 M. CREMONA, The “Dynamic and Homogeneous” EEA: Byzantine Structures and Variable Geometry, in 
European Law Review, 1994, p. 508 et seq. 
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patchy and fragmented, but also short of a coherent and overarching institutional ar-
rangement. The relations between the EU and Switzerland are governed by over 120 
bilateral agreements, with some of them envisaging rather standard institutional ar-
rangements built on joint committees.122 An overarching institutional agreement was 
expected to serve as a panacea. Alas, despite a successful end to the negotiations, 
which had been filled with twists and dramas, the agreement in question is yet to enter 
into force.123 Nevertheless, it has already served as a model for the EU-UK Withdrawal 
Agreement, and it was expected to be employed again for the post-Brexit framework.124 
In the case of other treaties between the EU and its neighbours, the institutional ar-
rangements are not as ambitious and generally follow the same pattern. They are com-
prised of bilateral councils and committees, as well as institutional outlets bringing to-
gether parliamentarians from the European Parliament and the legislatures of neigh-
 
122 See, in particular, the Bilateral I and Bilateral II packages. The former comprises Agreement between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, 
on the free movement of persons; Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confedera-
tion on Air Transport; Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the 
Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road; Agreement between the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural products; Agreement between the European Community and 
the Swiss Confederation on mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment; Agreement between 
the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of government procurement. The 
main components of Bilateral II are: Agreement between the European Union, the European Community 
and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application 
and development of the Schengen acquis; Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the state responsible for examining 
a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland; Agreement between the European Com-
munity and the Swiss Confederation providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Council Di-
rective 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments; Agreement between the 
European Community and the Swiss Confederation amending the Agreement between the European Eco-
nomic Community and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 as regards the provisions applicable to pro-
cessed agricultural products; Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation 
concerning the participation of Switzerland in the European Environment Agency and the European Envi-
ronment Information and Observation Network; Agreement between the European Community and the 
Swiss Confederation on cooperation in the field of statistics; Agreement for scientific and technological co-
operation between the European Union and European Atomic Energy Community and the Swiss Confedera-
tion associating the Swiss Confederation to Horizon 2020 – the Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation and the Research and Training Programme of the European Atomic Energy Community comple-
menting Horizon 2020, and regulating the Swiss Confederation's participation in the ITER activities carried 
out by Fusion for Energy. 
123 See further C. KADDOUS, Switzerland and the EU. Current Issues and New Challenges under the Draft 
Institutional Framework Agreement, in S. GSTÖHL, D. PHINNEMORE (eds), The Proliferation of Privileged Partner-
ships Between the European Union and Its Neighbours, cit., p. 68 et seq.; R. SCHWOK, Switzerland-EU Relations, 
cit., p. 159 et seq.; A. ŁAZOWSKI, Draft EU-Swiss Institutional Agreement, cit. 
124 On lessons for Brexit from the EU-Swiss experience, see C. TOBLER, One of Many Challenges after 
‘Brexit’. The Institutional Framework of an Alternative Agreement – Lessons from Switzerland and Elsewhere?, in 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2016, p. 583 et seq. 
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bouring countries.125 In the case of some neighbours, with whom relations are particu-
larly dynamic or strategically important, the agreements envisage the regular holding of 
bilateral summits at the highest political level.126 Furthermore, the creation of bilateral 
platforms for NGOs is also common practice.127 In procedural terms, it is notable that 
the joint authorities, which make up the institutional fabric of the EU and its neigh-
bours, are traditionally equipped with decision-making powers as well as competences 
aiming at dispute settlement.128  
All of the above is reflected in the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and in the post-
Brexit Agreements. It is notable that as of 1 January 2021 two sets of EU-UK bilateral 
bodies operate in parallel. On the one hand, the joint institutions envisaged in the EU-
UK WA are in charge of the Withdrawal Agreement, including the implementation of the 
contentious Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the EU-UK WA provides 
for complex dispute settlement modus operandi, with a special role reserved for the 
Court of Justice. On the other hand, the EU-UK TCA, EU-UK SPCI and Euratom-UK SPNE 
contain sets of institutional provisions and, in the case of the EU-UK TCA, general as well 
as sectoral variations of the dispute settlement procedures. All are presented in turn. 
vii.2. Institutional framework in the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement  
As a starting point, a reminder is fitting that the United Kingdom formally ceased its 
participation in the EU’s institutional framework on 31 January 2020. During the transi-
tional period, it did have the hybrid status of a country which was en route from EU 
membership to a future relationship of sorts. In substantive terms, it was business as 
usual for the duration of the transition. To put it differently, the United Kingdom was 
bound by EU law in its entirety. In terms of infringement procedures and preliminary 
rulings, the United Kingdom was treated as if it were still an EU Member State.129 How-
ever, as of the day of Brexit, it no longer benefited from participation in EU decision-
making.130 It is notable that the status of the United Kingdom was downgraded to levels 
going below what the EEA-EFTA countries and the Swiss authorities are offered. In the 
 
125 For instance, see in relation to the EU-Ukraine AA, G. VAN DER LOO, The EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Trade Area, cit., p. 204 et seq. 
126 See, for instance, Art. 460 EU-Ukraine AA. 
127 See, for instance, Art. 469 EU-Ukraine AA.  
128 See further, inter alia, W. WEIß, Delegation to Treaty Bodies in EU Agreements: Constitutional Con-
straints and Proposals for Strengthening the European Parliament, in European Constitutional Law Review, 
2018, p. 532 et seq. 
129 Art. 131 EU-UK WA. 
130 It is notable that HM Government has already pulled out of the Council and its preparatory bod-
ies as of 1 September 2019. To analyse the political and legal merits of that decision would, however, 
goes beyond the scope of the present analysis.  
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latter case, participation in so-called decision-shaping is assured.131 However, in the 
case of the United Kingdom, such a modus for participation was available merely in se-
lected cases and, more importantly, only by invitation.132 Furthermore, as of the date of 
Brexit, the United Kingdom no longer had members of the European Parliament or the 
advisory bodies. The terms of judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union also 
came to an end. The Advocate General Sharpston continued to work, however she was 
not permitted to serve her term to the end.133  
With this in mind, the EU-UK WA contains provisions which, on the one hand, regu-
late the detachment of the UK from the EU institutions and, on the other hand, provide 
an institutional framework operational as of 1 February 2020. It is centred on the Joint 
Committee, which was established as per Art. 164 EU-UK WA.134 It is co-chaired by both 
sides and convenes whenever requested, but subject to the caveat that it meets at least 
once a year. The political level at which the Joint Committee meets is determined in 
casu. To put it differently, it is not predetermined by the EU-UK WA. The tasks of the 
Joint Committee are, in general terms, to supervise the implementation, the application 
and the interpretation of the EU-UK WA. This multidisciplinary body is equipped, in 
equal measure, with powers to take decisions and make recommendations, as well as 
to serve as a dispute settlement body.135 As noted earlier in the present Article, the Joint 
Committee is empowered to take decisions in politically explosive matters, including the 
details of trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Some of its tasks may be 
delegated to six specialised committees envisaged by the EU-UK WA, as well as other 
such committees that the Joint Committee may establish depending on needs.136 Inter-
estingly, the EU-UK WA envisages neither the creation of a joint parliamentary body nor 
a platform for cooperation between NGOs. This is perplexing bearing in mind that parts 
of the EU-UK WA are most likely to remain relevant for years following Brexit. 
The EU-UK WA also contains carefully crafted provisions governing dispute settle-
ment. They apply as of the end of the transitional period.137 It is notable that the modi 
operandi in this respect are the only procedural avenues available to the parties. How-
ever, as made clear in Art. 168 EU-UK WA, in cases of disputes arising from the applica-
tion of the EU-UK WA the parties may not have recourse to other dispute settlement 
methods or outlets. At the initial stages of the dispute settlement, the institution in 
 
131 See further, inter alia, A. ŁAZOWSKI, Draft EU-Swiss Institutional Agreement, cit. 
132 Art. 128, para. 5, EU-UK WA. 
133 For a detailed account see D. VLADIMIROVICH KOCHENOV, G. BUTLER, The Independence and Lawful 
Composition of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Replacement of Advocate General Sharpston and the 
Battle for the Integrity of the Institution, Jean Monnet Working Paper 2/2020, jeanmonnetprogram.org. 
134 Its Rules of Procedure are annexed to EU-UK WA. 
135 Art. 164 EU-UK WA.  
136 Ibid., Art.164, para. 5.  
137 See, inter alia, A. DASHWOOD, The Withdrawal Agreement, cit., p. 183 et seq.; J. LARIK, Decision-Making 
and Dispute Settlement, cit., p. 191 et seq. 
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charge is – not surprisingly – the Joint Committee. Should a solution not be available, an 
arbitration panel composed of EU and UK representatives may be established by the 
Joint Committee.138 It merits attention that as per Art. 174 WA, in the case of disputes 
touching upon EU law, the arbitration panel has an obligation to proceed with refer-
ences for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.139 Thus, it is clear that the claims of 
some representatives of the Brexit camp that withdrawal from the European Union 
ends the jurisdiction of the Court are clearly unfounded.  
vii.3. Skeleton of the post-Brexit institutional structure envisaged in 
the Political Declaration 
While the institutional framework envisaged in the EU-UE WA serves the application of 
the latter, any future relations agreements were ab initio expected to contain the insti-
tutional frameworks in their own right. The basic parameters of how this may look were 
outlined in the Political Declaration. As a general rule, the Political Declaration talked 
about “an overarching institutional framework”, with tailor-made sectoral arrangements 
for selected dossiers.140 The joint institutional outlets were planned to serve the strate-
gic dialogue, as well as the management and supervision of the post-Brexit framework. 
Not surprisingly, the bilateral Joint Committee was pencilled in to be at the heart of the 
institutional machinery, including the dispute settlement procedure. As far as the latter 
was concerned, a role played by the Court of Justice of the European Union was also 
envisaged, along the lines of the EU-UK WA.141  
vii.4. EU-UK joint institutions in the post-Brexit framework 
A comprehensive institutional set-up was proposed by the European Union in the Draft 
Agreement. As per Art. INST.1, the leading role was allocated to the Partnership Council. It 
would be assisted by specialised committees and working groups. Furthermore, Art. 
INST.5 provided for the Parliamentary Partnership Assembly. As well-established in the 
recent treaty practice of the EU, a civil society outlet was also on the cards.142 Not surpris-
ingly, the proposed dispute settlement modus operandi largely followed the footsteps of 
the EU-UK WA, providing for consultations within the Partnership Council and the creation 
of arbitration tribunals to settle disputes. Building on what was agreed in the Political Dec-
 
138 Decision 7/2020 of the Joint Committee established by the Agreement on the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atom-
ic Energy Community of 22 December 2020 establishing a list of 25 persons who are willing and able to 
serve as members of an arbitration panel under the Agreement. 
139 Similar modi operandi are provided in EU-Ukraine AA, EU-Georgia AA, EU-Moldova AA. 
140 Para. 118 of the Political Declaration. 
141 Ibid., para. 131. 
142 Art. INST. 8 Draft Agreement. 
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laration, a special role for the Court of Justice of the European Union was also envisaged 
in Art. INST.16 of the Draft Agreement. As already alluded to, the latter solution became 
one of the main bones of contention during the actual negotiations. While the Brexiteers, 
including Prime Minister B. Johnson, were happy to approve the WA and the Political Dec-
laration, they opted for a reverse ferret before the ink dried. 
The EU-UK TCA establishes a comprehensive bilateral institutional framework aim-
ing at proper management of the Agreement and its implementation. While it builds on 
the Commission proposal made in the Draft Agreement, one feature is striking. The en-
tire title on the institutional framework has been moved forward from the closing parts 
of the Draft Agreement to the opening sections of the EU-UK TCA. In terms of what it 
precisely covers, it is fitting to start with a feature, which, in fact, does not exist. Unlike 
the case with some of the EU’s leading partners, the Agreement does not envisage regu-
lar bilateral summits. It goes without saying that they may be arranged ad hoc, yet it still 
amounts to a political anomaly that the European Union regularly holds annual sum-
mits, for instance with Ukraine, but this will not be the case in a similarly organised 
fashion with its former Member State. Instead, the highest political institution estab-
lished on the basis of the EU-UK TCA is the Partnership Council, which on the EU side 
will be co-chaired by a member of the European Commission, while the UK will be rep-
resented by a person at ministerial level.143 There are a number of factors that make 
the Partnership Council worth looking at closely. As noted earlier, the word “partner-
ship” has disappeared from the title of the Agreement and from its opening provision 
outlining the aims of relations. Still, the negotiators found it fitting to keep the original 
name of the institution in question, just as it was proposed by the European Commis-
sion in the Draft Agreement. Labels aside, the Partnership Council is likely to play a 
leading role as a platform for dialogue between the European Union, its Member States, 
as well as the authorities in London. Meetings may be called either on the initiative of 
the EU, or of the United Kingdom. It is important to note that its composition is likely to 
vary, and it will hinge on the agenda. Although Art. INST.1 EU-UK TCA may seem to im-
ply that only the EU and the UK would be represented, Art. 2, para. 1, of Council Deci-
sion 2020/2252 on signing and provisional application of EU-UK TCA and EU-UK SPCI 
makes it clear that each Member State is also allowed to send one representative.144 
The main role played by the EU-UK Partnership Council is to oversee the implementa-
tion of the EU-UK TCA. In particular, it has the competence to adopt binding decisions 
and soft law recommendations. This includes, whenever specified in the EU-UK TCA, re-
visions of the Agreement itself. It should be noted that the consequence of Art. 
 
143 Art. INST 1 EU-UK TCA. 
144 A similar modus operandi applies to the joint institutions established as per EU-UK WA. For in-
stance, during the second meeting of the EU-UK Joint Committee a total of 15 Member States was repre-
sented. See Press statement by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič following the second meeting of the EU-UK 
Joint Committee, Brussels 12 June 2020, Statement/20/1055, ec.europa.eu, p. 1. 
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COMPROV.16 EU-UK TCA is that, unlike in the EU-Turkey framework, the decisions of 
the Partnership Council may not produce direct effect.145  
The work of the Partnership Council is supported by EU-UK committees established 
under Art. INST.2 EU-UK TCA.146 They, too, are empowered to monitor the application of 
the EU-UK TCA and they are equipped with the power to make binding decisions. Bear-
ing in mind their highly specialised character, they will meet at the technical level. Fur-
thermore, the creation of bilateral working groups is also envisaged.147 It is interesting 
to note that the rules on the creation of an EU-UK parliamentary framework were wa-
tered down during the negotiations. Its creation is now an option, not a fait accompli as 
per the original proposal laid down in the Draft Agreement. If created, it will serve as a 
platform for exchange between the European Parliament and the UK Parliament, and it 
will have the power to make recommendations to the Partnership Council. Finally, a Civ-
il Society Forum is also on the cards.148  
For the completeness of the present analysis, it should be added that no separate 
institutional framework is envisaged under the EU-UK SPCI. However, any matters of 
relevance for its implementation may be discussed by the Partnership Council.149 In 
contrast, the Euratom-UK SPNE envisages the creation of a bilateral joint committee.150 
As already noted, one of the hotly debated and negotiated matters was the dispute 
settlement modi operandi. While they are discussed in detail in the forthcoming second 
instalment of the present Article, a few phenomena are worth noting. Firstly, the system 
provided by the EU-UK TCA is very patchy. Apart from the general dispute settlement 
procedure, several tailor-made rules are provided for various parts of the EU-UK TCA. 
 
145 Sevince, cit. See further, inter alia, N. CAMBIEN, Case C-192/89, S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1990:322, delivered 20 September 1990, in G. BUTLER, R.A. WESSEL (eds), EU External Relations 
Law, cit.  
146 This includes the Trade Partnership Committee; the Trade Specialised Committee on Goods; the 
Trade Specialised Committee on Customs Cooperation and Rules of Origin; the Trade Specialised Com-
mittee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; the Trade Specialised Committee on Technical Barriers 
to Trade; the Trade Specialised Committee on Services, Investment and Digital Trade; the Trade Special-
ised Committee on Intellectual Property; the Trade Specialised Committee on Public Procurement; the 
Trade Specialised Committee on Regulatory Cooperation; the Trade Specialised Committee on Level Play-
ing Field for Open and Fair Competition and Sustainable Development; the Trade Specialised Committee 
on Administrative Cooperation in VAT and Recovery of Taxes; the Specialised Committee on Energy; the 
Specialised Committee on Air Transport; the Specialised Committee on Aviation Safety; the Specialised 
Committee on Road Transport; the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination; the Special-
ised Committee on Fisheries; the Specialised Committee on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation; 
the Specialised Committee on Participation in Union Programmes.  
147 Art. INST. 3 EU-UK TCA provides for creation of the Working Group on Organic Products; the 
Working Group on Motor Vehicles and Parts; the Working Group on Medicinal Products; the Working 
Group on Social Security Coordination. 
148 Art. INST. 8 EU-UK TCA provides that the parties have to facilitate its creation. 
149 Art. INST 1, para. 4e, EU-UK TCA. 
150 Art. 19 Euratom-UK SPNE. 
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This is the case, for instance, in relation to the politically toxic issue of the level playing 
field. Secondly, at the insistence of the United Kingdom, the arbitration tribunals will not 
have the jurisdiction to request preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union. Thirdly, the role of the Partnership Council, which had a prominent role 
in the Draft Agreement, has been somewhat reduced. Fourthly, tailor-made, though 
very much more modest, rules on dispute settlement are also provided in the EU-UK 
SPCI151 and the Euratom-UK SPNE.152 
VIII. Conclusions 
On 1 January 2021, the European Union and the United Kingdom entered a new phase 
of their troubled relationship. It was never a marriage of love and passion, accompa-
nied by belief in the aims of the European integration project. In many ways, almost five 
decades of UK membership in the European Communities, and later in the European 
Union, represented a classic case of a square peg in a round hole. Now, with the transi-
tional period over and the post-Brexit package in place, the formal framework for bilat-
eral relations is ready. From the point of view of the European Union, relations with the 
United Kingdom, although idiosyncratic, have entered the path of an external relations 
exercise. Thus, they should be perceived accordingly. Five years from now, when the 
first formal review of the EU-UK TCA takes place, the story of EU membership is likely to 
be a distant memory. One thing is certain. Brexit or, in more general terms, withdrawal 
from the European Union is akin to peeling an onion. There are many layers to uncover 
and with every one it is impossible not to shed a tear. The first days of life outside the 
Internal Market are proving to be rather turbulent, overshadowed by the reality of be-
ing away from the European Union. A likely scenario is further negotiations in the hope 
that the dossiers left out during the post-Brexit talks may find their way back into the 
EU-UK bilateral framework. This theme, alongside an analysis of the substance of the 
EU-UK TCA and the dispute settlement modi operandi will follow in the next instalment 
of the present Article. 
 
151 Art. 18 EU-UK SPCI. 
152 Art. 21 Euratom-UK SPNE. 
 
